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Analysts have long viewed voting behaviour as dominantly structured 
by class conlict. In today’s post-industrialization era, Western societies are 
faced with a progressive melting down of the traditional working class and an 
increasing dualism between labour market insiders and outsiders, two groups 
with unequal levels of employment security and prospects (Emmenegger, 
Palier, Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). Those on the “inside” occupy well-paid stable 
jobs with good access to social welfare entitlements, while those on the 
“outside” confront increasing levels of social and economic risks. Our paper 
addresses the political impact of this structural divide in the European elec-
tions of May 22-25, 2014. To sustain this assessment, we compare the impact 
of various indicators of socio-economic position on vote choice.
To test to what extent this new divide predicts vote choice, we use data from 
a cross national post electoral survey conducted just after the 2014 European 
elections in seven countries1: France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece. These seven cases display contrasted economic, social and political 
















poverty risk gini index
austria 0,3 4.8 8.7 18.8 14.4 27.0
germany 0,4 5.2 8.1 20.3 16.1 29.7
france 0,2 10.8 24.6 18.1 13.7 30.1
portugal -1,4 15.5 37.7 27.4 18.7 34.2
italy -1,9 12.7 35.3 28.4 19.1 32.5
spain -1,2 26.7 53.2 27.3 20.4 33.7
greece -3,9 27.4 55.3 35.7 23.1 34.4
eu 28 0.1  10.9 23 0 24.5 16.7 30.5
Sources: Eurostat data for 2013 except youth unemployment (2012), population at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion according to the SILC-EU deinition before and after social transfers, Gini index 
(0-100) for household disposable income.
The main economic divide runs between the northern and the southern 
countries of our sample. The southern countries of our sample were more 
seriously afected by the 2008 Great Recession than the northern ones (Table 1). 
In 2013, the year before the election, only Austria, Germany and France display 
a positive growth rate, all the other countries are in recession, with a record 
negative rate of almost -4% in Greece. Unemployment follows a similar pattern, 
below the 28 European Union (EU) average in the three northern cases, and 
well above in the southern ones. But the rates are more dispersed, from some 
5% in Austria and Germany, to the double in France and Italy, the triple in 
Portugal, and more than ive times higher in Spain and Greece. If one looks at 
the unemployment rates among the young, always overrepresented among the 
outsiders (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012, p.34 and 2013), the comparative 
igures are even more impressive, ranging between some 8% in Austria and 
Germany and over 50% in Spain and Greece. The risk of poverty and social 




higher in the southern group, reaching a peak in Greece where over one third 
of the population is concerned, compared to less than 20% in Austria, Germany 
and France. And if the welfare state still acts as a cushion and softens the impact 
of poverty, even after social transfers, the same cleavage endures. On the whole, 
the southern societies studied are more unequal than the northern ones, as 
summed up by the Gini index on disposable household income (Table 1). 

























portugal L/R coalition 33.7 (-3.1) Left (PS) - -












The political supply is also quite diferent from one group of country to 
another (Table 2). In Austria as in France, the most noticeable trend is the elec-
toral dynamic of far right parties. In France the lists of the National Front drew 
almost a quarter of the valid votes, coming ahead of the mainstream left by 
following  three conditions:  at  risk of poverty, meaning below  the poverty  threshold,  in  a 
situation of severe material deprivation, living in a household with very low work intensity.
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11 percentage points, of the conservative right by 4 points, and improving its 
score of 2009 by 18 points. There was no similar take-of at the other end of 
the political spectrum, where the Eurosceptic left led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
and the Front de Gauche drew hardly 6% of the votes (instead of 11.1% in the 
2012 presidential election). In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) came in third 
position, but with a score of almost 20% of the valid votes, 7 points higher than 
in the previous European elections. As for Germany until now the progres-
sion of its far right movements such as the Republicans in 1989, was limi-
ted and short lived. But in 2014 a new Eurosceptic movement, Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), started by a Hamburg economics professor, made a surprisin-
gly good score (7%). In the South, on the contrary, left-wing anti-austerity radi-
cals are more dynamic. In Greece the extreme right, led by the neo-Nazi party 
Golden Dawn, drew more than 9% of the votes, but the dynamic of SYRIZA, the 
party led by Alexis Tsipras, was even more spectacular, its lists coming ahead 
of the socialist left and the conservative right, with a record score of 26.6%. In 
Spain, the conservative right came irst, but the surprise came from the good 
score received by a four-month-old party, Podemos, to the left of the socialist left. 
Founded by a charismatic political scientist, Pablo Iglesias, in the wake of the 
indignados mobilizations against austerity and unemployment, it drew some 8% 
of the votes, sending 5 deputies to the European Parliament. In Portugal no new 
signiicant movement emerged despite equally dramatic economic conditions. 
But the electorate voted for the socialist opposition, whose lists came ahead 
all others, against the government’s austerity policies. The Italian case stands 
apart, where the Northern League made a very poor score, and where the rising 
newcomer is the populist and Eurosceptic Five Star Movement (M5S) founded 
in 2009 by the comedian Beppe Grillo (21.1%). It had rapidly become the second 
party of Italy, but it was not the case in the European elections, where it only 
got some 21% of the votes, beaten by the socialist Democratic Party and its new 
leader and Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, who drew a record score of 40.8%. 
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The last political feature to take into consideration is the level of mobili-
zation. Participation in the European elections has been gradually declining, 
from 62% of registered voters in 1979 to 42.5% in 2014. But the situation 
diverges from one country to another. Turnout reached its minimum in 
Portugal, where hardly one third of the voters went to the polls, continuing 
a trend observed since the end of the 1990s. But it rocketed up in Greece to 
a record 60%, with the hopes aroused by the success of the radical left party, 
SYRIZA. Elsewhere, the trends were less spectacular. Participation fell sharply 
in Italy (-7.8%), hardly in Spain, and Austria. On the contrary, it went up in 
Germany (+4.8%) and a little in France (+1.8%). 
Taken together, the seven countries of the sample ofer a good opportunity 
to test the political efects of class and outsiderness. After deining outsiderness 




A new distinction is emerging between the old structural divide of social 
class, based on occupation, and a new social divide called outsiderness, based 
on labour market status.  Here the relevant criteria for structuring social 
divides in a society are not limited to occupational strata based on a hierarchy 
of manual vs non-manual and skilled vs non-skilled occupations. Outsiderness 
considers whether a person has a weak vs a secure position in the labour market. 
Occupational structure—that is, class—and labor market status are thus inter-
connected in shaping a new social divide around insiders and outsiders.
Several diferent conceptualizations of outsiderness have been put forth 
in the literature. The most straightforward one, and the one that this paper 
utilizes in its analyses, draws the distinction between insiders and outsiders as 
a function of labour market status—between those who have stable and secure 
employment, and those who do not (Rueda, 2005).  In this conceptualization, 
insiders have protected jobs and are insulated from the threat of unemploy-
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ment, whereas outsiders are either unemployed, or holding precarious jobs 
characterized by low pay and low levels of protection and beneits. 
A second conceptualization of outsiderness emphasizes the risk of preca-
rious employment (i.e. of being unemployed or atypically employed—including 
temporary contracts and involuntary part-time work) at the occupational group 
level, compared to the average in the work force. Individuals are deined as 
outsiders according to the group they belong to, whatever their actual situation 
(Häusermann and Schwander, 2011). Research has established that exposure to 
labour market risks is a powerful predictor of political preference, and these 
risks can be categorized according to potential vs realized risk of being un- or 
under-employed (Cusack et al., 2006; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Mughan, 2007; 
Rehm, 2009, 2011). While both conceptualizations seek to capture preca-
riousness, the second one remains more class-based than the irst.
A third approach, going back to earlier work on subjective (vs objective) 
social class (Michelat, Simon, 1977), is to take into account, in a context of 
recession, the subjective dimension of outsiderness: one’s perceived socio-
economic position and even more importantly, its trajectory. Outsiderness 
should be linked to the feeling of being at the lower levels of society and/
or falling down, if not of, the social scale, experiencing downward mobility 
(Peugny, 2009; Goldthorpe and Jackman, 2007).
2.OUTSIDERNESS, SOCIAL POSITION, AND VOTE CHOICE
Academic attention to outsiderness and its political impact comes in the 
wake of long debates about the fading of class voting (Clark, Lipset, 1971; 
Franklin, Mackie, Valen, 1992; Evans, 1999; Knutsen, 2006; Thomassen, 2005). 
However, rather than the decline of class voting leading to a structural void, 
the literature on outsiderness suggests that the dualization between insiders 
and outsiders forms a new structural divide in society.
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The concept of outsiderness has irst been used in the research ields of 
political economy and more speciically the literature about the transforma-
tion of the welfare system and the way it contributes to a dualization process. 
More recent research has explored its political and electoral impact. It has 
been shown that outsiderness fosters non-voting (Bornschier, Kriesi, 2012; 
Mayer, 2014; Rovny and Rovny, 2015) and voting against the incumbent parties 
(Rueda, 2005; Lindvall and Rueda, 2012). With a few exceptions, there is still 
little work clearly articulating outsiderness with the sociology of class change 
in post-industrial societies. These exceptions include the pioneer work of 
Thomas Amossé and Olivier Chardon (2006) in France, that assumes the rise 
of a new “class” of manual and non manual unskilled workers, cutting across 
the traditional class lines; the work of Daniel Oesch (2006), retracing the evolu-
tion of class boundaries with new horizontal stratiications; and the works 
of Silja Häusermann and Hanna Schwander, which include a structural class 
dimension in their approach of outsiderness (Schwander, Häusermann, 2012; 
Häusermann, Kurer, Schwander 2015; Häusermann, Picot and Geering, 2013). 
In this paper we systematically check the impact of outsiderness, controlling 
for the other variables of social position, especially education3. 
Study after study (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; 
Gallego, 2007) shows that political participation is associated with socio-
economic status (education, income, occupation) and the resources that 
go with it (time, money, and civic skills). Because most of them lack these 
resources, outsiders should participate in politics less, and display lower levels 
of turnout, especially in the case of European elections which breed lower 
interest than national ones, due to their second-order nature (see Sauger 
in this volume). A previous study based on the irst ive ESS waves, indeed 
shows that in the case of national elections in the 16 Western European 
countries covered, outsiderness does not translate into a political divide. 
Traditional socio-economic factors, such as age, gender, education and 
income, structure voters’ decision-making. The main efect of outsiderness 
3  Income not taken  into account because of  the high  level of no answers (up to 19%  in 
Portugal, 18% in Austria) and the risk of colinearity with our other predictors. 
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is lower turnout (Rovny and Rovny, 2015). In addition, withdrawal from the 
labour market may entail a retreat into private life and a loss of social contact 
with co-workers, engendering a decreased sense of community, which may 
spill over into the realm of political and civic participation and engagement, 
leading to alienation and apathy (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeizel, 1972).
Political economy research, stemming from Downs’ pioneering work, 
links income and status loss with support for the left. The lower the median 
voter’s income falls below the mean income, the higher will be his/her support 
for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In this perspective, have-nots 
and outsiders should lean to the left, if not the extreme left, to defend their 
interests. Several studies have shown that outsiders have stronger preferences 
for state intervention and welfare guarantees (Häusermann and Schwander, 
2011). Others stress the fact that social-democratic parties are more inclined 
to defend insiders, and that this pushes outsiders away from them and toward 
more radical left parties (Lindvall and Rueda, 2013). 
Furthermore, the “New left” is seen as representing outsider interests 
more so than the “Old left,” as traditional left parties seem to protect the core 
interests of insiders who are more mobilized in trade unions and who have 
traditionally been the key constituency of the old left parties. The new working 
class, or “precariat”, is characterized by job insecurity, which is the new 
demarcation of a division among working-class voters, between old and new 
left parties.  Outsider preferences are thus seen as naturally divided between 
support for redistribution, on the one hand, and relaxed employment protec-
tion (liberalizing the hiring of outsiders) on the other. In this sense, neither 
the mainstream left (representing redistribution and protection of core worker, 
i.e. insider, jobs), nor the mainstream right (representing a more lexible labour 
market, but a reduced role of the state in the economy, i.e. less generous social 
policies) speaks to the needs and interests of the new outsider class. Therefore, 
outsiders have an incentive to look beyond the mainstream left and right, and 
seek representation at the extremes of the political spectrum. The new gene-
ration of radical left parties may provide a voice for demands of new social 
rights, whereas supporting radical right parties may either be a simple protest 
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against a system from which outsiders feel excluded, or a demand for welfare 
retrenchments against immigrants, which is known as welfare chauvinism 
(de Koster, Achterberg, van der Waal, 2012).
A third block of research focuses on the increasing appeal of the far right 
parties to the working class, in relation to the deterioration of its working and 
living condition, and the decline of the parties and unions that used to speak 
in its name. Research by Daniel Oesch (2006, 2008) on the transformation of 
class boundaries and the proletarianization of the social bases of the radical 
right; work by Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues on the way they appeal 
to “globalization losers” (Kriesi et al., 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012); 
Guy Standing’s (2011) work on the “new dangerous class”, the “precariat”, all 
go in the same direction. In that perspective, outsiders should be a potential 
reservoir of the populist radical right parties developing in Europe. Outsiders 
are disenchanted with the system, due to their declining status, and thus are 
more likely to vote for “anti-system” parties.  Here, however, it becomes neces-
sary to make a distinction between various types of outsiders. Whether one is 
better educated, therefore having increased earnings potential and having been 
exposed to diferent norms than someone who is less educated, despite having 
precarious employment, is likely to afect vote choice, with the less educated 
more likely to vote for the populist radical right. In the same line, recent work 
on the impact of social mobility stresses the appeal of the far right among 
downwardly mobile workers (Peugny, 2006 and 2009).
From this literature review, we derive the four following hypotheses:
H1. Objective class position no longer has an impact on vote choice; 
H2. Outsiders are less likely to go to the polls than insiders;
H3. Outsiders are less likely to vote for the mainstream parties of the left and 
of the right; they are more likely to vote for radical parties on either end of the 
political spectrum;
H4. Subjective social position and trajectory should have the same direction 
but more pronounced impact as objective indicators.
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3.OPERATIONALIZATION AND METHODS
To develop further and test the relationship between outsiderness, social posi-
tion, and vote choice, we rely on a dataset collected after the European elections of 
2014. A post-electoral survey has been conducted through the Internet, in the days 
following the elections, in seven diferent countries, with national representative 
samples of 4 000 people in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and 1 000 
people in Greece and Portugal (see Sauger, Dehousse, Gougou, 2015).
The key dependant variable of our analyses is vote choice. It is measured 
by a variable including ive items. It contrasts abstention (and voting for unclas-
siied parties) with voting for the radical left, the mainstream left, the mains-
tream right and the radical right (for the classiication of parties, see Table 1). In 
most cases, the categorization of parties in these families does not trigger major 
problems, social democratic parties representing the mainstream left parties, 
conservative and major Christian Democratic parties the mainstream right. 
As for Green parties, the choice was to include them in the family of mains-
tream left parties. Parties without clear left-right position have been added to 
abstention; this is the case mainly for very minor parties, except for the M5S in 
Italy (for more details on this party and its voters, see Ivaldi as well as Bedock 
and Vasilopoulos in this volume). Some choices for the classiication between 
mainstream right and radical right parties have been made as well. In particular, 
the AfD in Germany has been classiied as a mainstream right party as priority 
has been given to greater homogeneity of the radical right family. In any case, 
changes in classiications of single parties and especially smaller ones do not 
change signiicantly the results as the sample considered cover seven countries.
Our predictors of interest focus on four indicators. The two irst indicators 
test “objective” social position, i.e. occupation and outsiderness. Occupation 
has been classiied into ive categories, along the lines of the new typology 
proposed by Oesch (2006). These categories are the higher-grade service 
class (1), the lower-grade service class (2), the small business owners (3), skilled 
workers (4), and unskilled workers (5). These classes are based on a recoding of 
ISCO-08 classiication, aiming at capturing contemporary class cleavages. The 
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second objective indicator is outsiderness measured along the lines proposed by 
David Rueda (2005). It includes three categories. The irst is composed by insi-
ders: people retired or having a job, with a non-ixed term contract, working 
full time (or close to), or people owning their business (independents). They 
represent 60% of our sample on average, but less than 50% in Greece and Spain. 
The second category is outsiders, including unemployed people looking for a 
job, and workers with a temporary contract or without a contract, as well as 
people working part time (less than 18 hours a week). This category represents 
close to 30% of our sample, up to 44% in Greece. The third category combines 
people outside the labour market: mainly housewives, unemployed people not 
looking for a job, and students. The two other indicators of social position are 
based on subjective assessments. Current social position is directly measured 
by the answer on an eleven-point scale, from “poor” (0) to “rich” (10), to the 
question “Taking everything into account, at about what level would you put 
your family’s standard of living”. The second indicator used measures one’s 
social trajectory. It is built as the diference, on the same scale, between the 
respondent’s current situation and her situation ive years ago.
To test our hypotheses, we opt for multinomial logit models predicting the 
ive possible electoral choices previously delineated. We estimate our models on 
the entire sample of countries available in our data, and evaluate the predicted 
probabilities of each choice as our predictors of interest change, while all else 
is held constant (at its mean value). However, since three of the countries in 
our sample do not have any signiicant radical right parties (Germany, Portugal 
and Spain), we run a model omitting these three countries when assessing the 
predicted probabilities for radical right vote. Our estimates control for country 
ixed-efects, and correct for the clustering of answers by country.
To provide robust estimates of our variable of interests, a number of 
controls have been added to the models we test, in order to avoid omitted 
variable bias. These controls are the gender of the respondent, her age and 
the square of her age, her marital status (whether she lives alone or in a 
couple), the size of the household where she lives, whether she or any of 
her parents was born outside of the country where she votes, her level of 
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education (recoded into three categories, for primary, secondary and tertiary 
education), and her religious denomination (Catholic, other Christian, other 
religions, no religion). We now turn to present our results graphically, while 
all details are available in the appendix4. 
4.RESULTS
Our analysis aims to assess the efect of one’s relationship to the labour 
market on vote choice. We address this relationship in two ways. First, we 
consider the structural characteristics of individual voters in terms of their 
social class and their outsiderness. Second, we contrast these objective measu-
rements with subjective self-placements.
Figures 1 to 4 provide an overview of the results (detailed results are in the 
appendix). On the whole, the relationship to the labour market seems to have 
limited impact on political behaviour. As far as our main indings go, we irstly 
ind that subjective placements clearly outperform objective measurements in 
terms of accurately predicting behaviour. Those respondents who view their 
situation positively are signiicantly more likely to vote, and when they do, they 
are signiicantly more likely to support major parties. On the contrary, indi-
viduals who evaluate their social situation negatively are much more likely to 
abstain, and when they do vote, they cast their ballots in favour of radical left or 
right parties. Secondly, supporting radical left parties is surprisingly less condi-
tioned by the relation to the labour market than all other behaviours.
Considering the objective measurements more closely, we ind that outsi-
derness has two signiicant efects on political behaviour. First, being an outsider 
signiicantly reduces one’s propensity to turn out to vote. Indeed, outsiders are 
on average 5.1 percentage points less likely to vote than insiders. Second, outsi-
ders are signiicantly less likely to support major right parties. The propensity to 
vote for this party family decreases by 4.6 percentage points for outsiders. The 
efect of outsiderness on the support for major or radical left parties is minor 
and statistically insigniicant. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations in the 
4  The appendix is available online : <http://ress.revues.org/3006>.
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literature, outsiders are less likely to vote for radical right parties than insiders. 
In substantive terms, outsiders are 1.4 percentage points less likely to cast a vote 
for the radical right than insiders. While outsiders are signiicantly deterred 
from voting for the major right, there is no impact on major left vote. There is 
also no efect of outsiderness on radical left vote. Interestingly, the efect of social 
class on voting is relatively weak compared to the efect of outsiderness. We only 
ind decreased turnout propensity among the unskilled working class. 
Turning now to subjective measurements, the overall picture seems 
strikingly similar between subjective socio-economic position and subjec-
tive trajectory. A better self-perception is associated with higher turnout 
and more chances to support mainstream parties at the expense of radi-
cal parties, as is a subjective assessment of one’s positive trajectory. There 
is, however, an interesting diference between these indicators. Subjective 
position is associated with more variance of the chances for voting for the 
mainstream parties. Subjective trajectory is associated with more variance of 
the chances to support radical parties.
Figure 1. Vote Probability across insiders and outsiders 
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Figure 2. Vote Probability across social class
Figure. 3. Vote Probability across subjective social position
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Figure 4. Vote Probability across subjective social trajectory
CONCLUSION
“Old” social class, deined on the basis of occupation, does not seem to 
signiicantly structure vote choice in the 2014 European elections, with the 
exception of a slight efect on turnout, which declines as one moves down the 
class ladder, towards unskilled workers. Indeed, our indings seem to conirm 
the views of the now classical literature arguing for the decline of class voting 
(H1 conirmed). Our indings, however, also point to the possibility that labour 
market dualization, as expressed in the formation of insider and outsider groups, 
may start forming a new social divide that will come to structure politics.
Our analyses suggest that the new structural divide of outsiderness has 
signiicant negative efects on some key vote choices. Outsiders are less likely to 
vote (H2 conirmed), and they are likely to eschew casting a ballot for the major 
right (H3 conirmed). This negative efect points to two conclusions about 
outsiders and politics. First, outsiders do not (yet) consider themselves a social 
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group that may be able to perceive their particular social situation, organize, 
and pursue their interests in the political arena. Indeed, the increased likelihood 
that outsiders turn away from politics and abstain from voting suggests that they 
may be particularly limited in their ability to organize. Second, most political 
parties do not (yet) cater to the interests of outsiders, and remain relatively inept 
at exploiting the social grievances of these groups. However, given the increased 
insider-outsider dualism in the context of the recent economic crisis, this social 
divide may prove a useful mobilizing tool for various political entrepreneurs. 
Finally, our analyses suggest that the most substantively signiicant predic-
tor of voting behaviour, as expected in Hypothesis 4, in a context of economic 
crisis, is the subjective assessment of one’s social position and trajectory. This 
survey was not speciically designed to study outsiderness, but it is clear that 
its subjective dimension, which until now has hardly been explored, ofers a 
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